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Abstract
Foreign policy is a crucial factor in ensuring the safety and prosperity of any nation. In
some cases, this may include projecting strength and taking decisive action towards other
countries. Entities within the Russian Federation have engaged the United States and other
democracies such as Ukraine and Estonia in multiple offensive cyber-attacks, each increasing in
scope and destruction. These cyber-attacks have caused a significant amount of damage to each
countries’ economy, industry, and infrastructure. The United States should take a strong, more
proactive approach towards cybersecurity through persistent engagement and further
collaboration with the private sector. In addition to addressing the issue unilaterally, the United
States should work with NATO counterparts to identify, intercept, and expose the actors
committing cyber-attacks. Moreover, the U.S. should promote its allies to take conjoint actions
against Russian cyber-attacks. U.S. allies could voluntarily support each other’s responses to
significant malicious cyber incidents through intelligence sharing, public statements of support
for actions taken following an attack, and participation in the charge taken against the perpetrator
state/entity. The United States should also place economic sanctions on the aggressors within
Russia that conduct cyber-warfare with the United States and/or its allies. These sanctions should
only follow thorough intelligence leading to accurate identification of the perpetrators. These
actions will project strength, promote security, and bolster relationships between the U.S. and
other free nations.
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Introduction
Ensuring a safe and secure United States requires projecting strength and taking decisive
action. Recently, cyber-attacks from entities within the Russian Federation have targeted the
economy, industry, and infrastructure of the United States, Ukraine, and Estonia. The cumulative
effects of these cyber-attacks have caused a significant amount of damage and there seems to be
no end to these transgressions. The United States needs to take a strong, proactive approach
towards cybersecurity through persistent engagement and further collaboration with the private
sector. In addition, the United States should work with NATO counterparts to identify, intercept,
and expose the actors committing cyber-attacks, and promote all U.S. allies to take conjoint
actions against Russian cyber-attacks. Furthermore, the United States should place economic
sanctions on the entities within the Russian Federation when they conduct cyber-warfare with the
United States and/or its allies. These actions will project strength, promote security, and bolster
relationships between the U.S. and other free nations.
Entities within the Russian Federation have engaged the United States in two recent
cyber-attacks which caused considerable damage. These were ransomware attacks targeting
Colonial Pipeline and all JBS’s U.S. meatpacking facilities. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware
attack took place on May 7th, 2021. This 5,500-mile pipeline supplies 45% of fuel consumed on
the East Coast of the United States and runs from Houston, Texas to Linden, New Jersey.
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Moreover, this pipeline transports around 2.5 million barrels of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and
other products in a day.2 The results of this attack led to gas shortages throughout several states.
Colonial Pipeline was forced to pay a $5 million ransom to the hacker group within Russia to
allow gas to flow again.3
A few weeks after the Russian ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, JBS USA
meatpacking facilities were forcefully shut down throughout the United States on June 2nd, 2021.
The majority of these facilities were shut down for at least a day according to JBS USA.
Additionally, the attack affected servers supporting its IT (Information Technology) systems not
only in North America but also Australia.4 This ransomware attack caused meat shortages
throughout the U.S. and raised prices for consumers. JBS USA released a media statement on
June 9th, 2021, confirming that it paid $11 million in ransom to a hacker group within Russia to
allow the facilities to become operational again.5
Entities within the Russian Federation have additionally engaged Ukraine in multiple
cyber-attacks. Two recent cyber-attacks on Ukraine have been the NotPetya cyber-attack and the
Ukrainian Government website shutdowns. The NotPetya cyber-attack took place on June 27th,
2017, affecting many businesses throughout Ukraine. Eventually, this attack spread to other
companies within Germany, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and the
United States. When this cyber-attack first appeared, it was thought to be a ransomware attack.
The victims were notified that their files would be locked until ransom money was paid to the
assailants. However, this cyber-attack infected an accounting software known as MeDoc which
existed on multiple platforms used by organizations that do business in Ukraine.6 The infected
software disrupted, damaged, and gained unauthorized access to various company servers. This
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software caused $10 billion in losses around the world.7 The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 8
and United Kingdom NCSC (National Cybersecurity Centre) have found with certainty that the
mock ransomware virus dubbed NotPetya was created by the military spy agency of the Russian
Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU).9 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, six Russian
GRU officers were charged in connection with the Notpetya cyberattacks with worldwide
deployment of destructive malware and other disruptive actions in cyberspace.10 The official
charges are as follows:
On Oct. 15, 2020, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh returned an indictment charging six
computer hackers, all of whom were residents and nationals of the Russian Federation
(Russia) and officers in Unit 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU),
a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces…[t]hese GRU
hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks intended to
support Russian government efforts to undermine, retaliate against, or otherwise
destabilize: (1) Ukraine; (2) Georgia; (3) elections in France…”11
The Ukrainian Government website shutdowns took place on January 14th, 2022. The
Ukrainian Government’s agency Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security
issued a statement directly blaming Russia for the hack considering increased tensions between
Ukraine and Russia. The hackers left text in Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian on some of the
websites stating, “Ukrainians! All your personal data was uploaded to the internet. All data on
the computer is being destroyed. All information about you became public. Be afraid and expect
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the worst.”12 However, the attack was merely simple defacements, Ukraine suggests.13
Moreover, this attack was solely to provoke and intimidate Ukrainians.
Though Estonia has not been a recent victim of Russian cyber-attacks, it is relevant to
mention that Russian cyber-attacks were highly effective in hampering Estonia’s cyber-sphere.
These attacks were successful in crippling dozens of Estonian government, corporate, and bank
websites. The attacks commenced in April and May of 2007. Some of these sites were taken
down while others were just disrupted. This assault lasted a relentless 22 days.14
Working with the Private Sector
Entities within Russia, sometimes in collaboration with state actors, have been notorious
for the onslaught on nation cyber-spheres in recent years. It is imperative that the United States
come up with new and improved ways in deterring these attacks on itself and its allies. Hence,
taking a stronger, more proactive approach towards cybersecurity through persistent engagement
and further collaboration with the private sector. This is imperative to avert Russian cyber
aggression.
The United States has already been using federal agencies like the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to work with cybersecurity organizations in the U.S. private sector for some
time now. On October 28th, 2021, the Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray explained that the
FBI has a dedicated Office of Private Sector, private sector coordinators in every field office
across the country, and teams in operational divisions like Counterintelligence and Cyber coming
up with ways to protect the American people in working with the private sector on threats they
encounter.15 He identifies that we need the insight, knowledge, and experience that cybersecurity
experts possess. He explains that sharing information is in the best interest of the American
people and lays out tactics such as combining intelligence that has been collected. This would
bolster the overall security posture of U.S. entities before breaches occur. In addition, sharing
indicators with one another, the United States can build a productive cycle that strengthens the
country.16 This further emphasizes the idea that the U.S. private sector is extremely innovative
and that solely relying on the U.S. Government for progression is inefficient.
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The U.S. has recently prioritized further collaboration with the private cybersecurity
sector and has recruited more companies working in this field. Government contract mainstays
such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon continue to play an integral role. As of 2021, this
exclusive list has expanded to include tech giants such as Alphabet Inc., Apple, and Microsoft.17
These companies, while powerful and moderately knowledgeable regarding cybersecurity, can
pose a threat to national security. The United States should be conscientious when integrating
product-based companies into its strategy of deterring cyber aggression. These companies, while
based in the United States, do not have any obligation to the United States Government or to
protect its citizens or interests. They are also well implemented in countries such as Russia and
China as product suppliers with an economic incentive to continue service in those countries.
According to Statista, in Q2 of 2021, 67% of Apple’s revenue was generated outside of the
United States.18 Provided that the U.S. Government remains the highest bidder for these tech
giants, the security risks will remain manageable, but this is not a compromise the United States
should make.
Apple, Microsoft, and Alphabet are primarily focused on the individual consumer and
implement cybersecurity in personal products. These tech commodities are created to be
accessible and convenient for the consumer. While security is a high priority for each of these
companies, this is not their primary concern or area of expertise. Security risks have also been
noted by cybersecurity professionals in many products provided by these three companies. The
United States should invest in smaller, more experienced cybersecurity companies in the private
sector that are based solely in America. This will counteract conflicting interests and ensure a
further level of loyalty to the U.S. Government. Russian cyber aggression will be best deterred
through this course of action.
NATO has been generally successful in implementing the private sector of their various
nations into the cyber defense field and serves as an example of the private cybersecurity
industry aiding the public sector. Through NCI Agency, the information technology,
communications and cyber defense arm of NATO, billions of dollars have been invested in
private companies from NATO countries to train and equip professionals in the public field to
defend against attacks.19 This is an example of successful strategy that has also been used by the
U.S. Department of Defense. These investments show a common strategy among NATO
member states which has been extremely successful. Through sharing strategies and information,
the U.S. and NATO can learn from one another the best means to deter cyber aggression.
An additional course of action our federal government can take to strengthen the nation’s
security would be to invest tax paying dollars into private sector companies who are willing to
accept government contracts to educate K-12 students on the fundamental cybersecurity
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vocabulary, history, tactics, and operations. Following the Russian cyber-attacks in April and
May of 2007, NATO ally Estonia took a like-minded approach. The response to this 2007 attack
was the creation of a program aimed to educate Estonia’s young population, from kindergarten to
12th grade, on digital skills and staying safe online. This initiative successfully created a young
generation of competent Estonians on cybersecurity, bolstering the countries national security.20
The implementation of a program like this would better prepare the United States in fighting the
war of the fifth domain. This program would also encourage high school students to take up
careers in the cybersphere industry producing a massive amount of American cybersphere
professionals. This would equip the United States with the right assets to deal with the evergrowing cyber threat.
An example that backs this proposal is how the United States reacted to the launch of
Sputnik. The U.S. had fallen behind the Soviet Union in the science and tech realm. In response,
the United States passed the National Defense Education Act in 1958 which provided large
amounts of financial funding to education at all levels of the public and private sector.21 After
this program was initiated the United States tech advancement significantly increased. Some
thought this was an invasion of the federal government in schooling at all levels.22 However, it
was necessary in competing with Soviet Russia’s goal of achieving superiority in spaceflight
capabilities in the 20th century which could have been detrimental to U.S. national security. The
United States needs to implement a program to enhance education in the cybersecurity sphere to
ensure we do not have another Sputnik incident which could turn into something more dire, such
as large-scale cyberattack grid shutdowns.
Working with NATO Counterparts
NATO was founded in 1949 with the full intention to “safeguard the freedom, common
heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law...to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”23 The
12 founding countries have since grown to 30 nations all with the same goal of furthering
security and prosperity in the North Atlantic region. According to NATO, the alliance was
formed to meet three objectives: “[to deter] Soviet expansionism, [forbid] the revival of
nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent and
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[encourage] European political integration.”24 The expansion of NATO has driven the alliance
closer to its main aggressor, Russia, with the addition of four former Warsaw Pact members
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and three former-Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania). This has broadened NATO’s responsibilities and increased the threat from
Russian interference in NATO activities.
NATO has focused heavily on cybersecurity since 2014 and as recently as January 2022
re-emphasized their commitment to security in the fifth domain:
To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber
defenses, NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by
Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. An updated action plan was endorsed by
Allies in February 2017. The 2014 policy established that cyber defense is part of the
Alliance’s core task of collective defense, confirmed that international law applies in
cyberspace, set out the further development of NATO’s and Allies’ capabilities, and
intensified NATO’s cooperation with industry.25
NATO has recently alluded to a policy of physical military action against any cyberattacks on
member states:
Appearing at the Atlantic Council’s headquarters in Washington ahead of NATO’s
summit in Brussels, Stoltenberg said NATO did not distinguish between cyber intrusions
and other forms of attacks. He noted that cyber aggression could trigger a military
response through “other means.” “In a way, it doesn’t matter whether it’s a kinetic attack
or a cyberattack, we will assess as allies whether it meets the thresholds for triggering
Article 5. It sends a message that we regard cyberattacks as seriously as any other
attack.”26
This has yet to be implemented based solely on an aggression against a member state, but
the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis can be traced back to Russian cyberaggression against the
Ukrainian central government. The response by the United States and NATO allies is the correct
approach to a cyberattack from within the Russian Federation. According to intel from the
Ukrainian Government, hackers from within the Russian Federation shut down major
government websites on January 14, 2022, “The websites of the country’s cabinet, seven
ministries, the treasury, the National Emergency Service, and the state services website, where
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Ukrainians’ electronic passports and vaccination certificates are stored, were temporarily
unavailable on Friday as a result of the hack.”27
Russia coincided this aggressive action by building a significant military force on
Ukraine’s eastern border, furthering the idea of simultaneous kinetic and cyber aggression.
NATO and the U.S. responded accordingly by deploying troops to eastern Europe to defend the
NATO alliance and Ukraine from invasion: “Denmark, Spain, France and the Netherlands were
all planning or considering sending troops, planes or ships to eastern Europe, NATO said.
Ukraine shares borders with four NATO countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.”28
The 2021-2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis is revealing of Russia’s ultimate strategy in two
ways. Firstly, it is now clear that a cyberattack will more than likely precede a kinetic attack,
especially when there is little resistance to that aggression. Secondly, there will be more
aggressive action coming out of the Russian Federation and NATO and the U.S. are not properly
prepared on the cyber-defense front. The evidence for the latter point has been addressed earlier
with the examples of successful cyberattacks against the United States such as the Colonial
Pipeline and JBS infrastructure attacks as well as the Notpetya attack.
NATO has been primarily concerned with building up cybersecurity in member states.
The next step, led by the United States, is to go on the offensive and accurately identify the
sources of these cyber aggressions. On several occasions, Russia has been able to hide behind the
idea that the cyber-attackers are not state-affiliated and fiend responsibility of aggressions from
within the Federation:
Three successive U.S. administrations have failed to develop any form of doctrine to
adequately address increasingly problematic cyberattacks from unattributable sources that
plague U.S. businesses and can even endanger lives. Instead, the private sector has been
left to deal with ever more destructive and dangerous ransomware attacks unassisted, and
Russia continues to do nothing about cyberattacks originating from Russian territory.29
This is an epidemic that can be cured by shifting from a conservative policy regarding the
cyberworld and towards a more proactive position. If the United States were able to identify
actors with precision, further measures could be taken to prevent attacks on the U.S.
infrastructure and on the private sector. In addition, being able to identify these actors would
allow the United States and its allies to expose the perpetrators worldwide through media with
solid evidence, damaging the perpetrator state’s reputation with the international community.
Once the United States can present solid evidence against cyber criminals, the United States and
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NATO allies can voluntarily take conjoint actions against the perpetrator state/entity. This can be
done through intelligence sharing, public statements of support for actions taken following an
attack, and participation in the charges taken against the perpetrator state/entity. This strategy is
reliant upon the ability of the United States and its allies to accurately identify perpetrators with a
proactive joint campaign.
Economic Sanctions on the Aggressors within the Russian Federation
Although some of the aforementioned cyberattacks have not been officially linked to the
Russian Government, they are originating within the Russian Federation. There has been
significant intelligence procured by the United States and its allies suggesting, and in some cases
proving, that there is a clear connection between the Russian Government, and these
cyberattacks.30 The United States should adopt a proactive approach to identifying connections
between the individuals threatening U.S. cybersecurity and the Russian Government if those
connections do indeed exist. Understanding the ultimate goals of these cyberattacks is important
and should inform the response of the U.S. Government. It is increasingly crucial that the U.S.
holds those who are truly behind these aggressions accountable, be that the Russian Government
or unaffiliated sources. This begins with a focus on precise identification and definitive
retaliatory actions such as sanctions against the perpetrating entities.
One of the many tools in the U.S. arsenal of diplomacy is economic sanctions levied
against nations, companies, or individuals. Within the realm of cybersecurity, economic
sanctions on the Russian oil and natural gas trade would be an effective deterrent against further
cyberaggression. The U.S. has ample experience with sanctions against Russia to varying
success. The sanctions in response to cyber threats must be swift and sweeping to be of
maximum value to the United States. Depending on the level of devastation following an attack
from Russia, the U.S. should incrementally increase sanctions on the financial sector of the
Russian Government.
This course of action coincides with the ability of the U.S. and its NATO allies to identify
the individual perpetrators of cyberaggression. These aggressors may then be personally
punished through addition to the SDN List (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List) in the United States. This will serve multiple purposes and cause financial harm to the
individuals responsible for attacks against the U.S. and its allies. According to OFAC (Office of
Foreign Assets Control) attorneys, “...as a result of their...designation they find that their assets
in the United States have been blocked, their bank accounts have been closed, and their credit
cards have been cancelled. I’ve seen people lose their jobs in major multinational companies,
lose their pensions, and lose access to other important property as a result of being placed on the
SDN list.”31
It is important to note that every preceding strategy must also be explored and applied.
Economic sanctions cannot be the exclusive means of deterring cyberattacks from within the
“Ukraine Cyber-Attack: Russia to Blame for Hack, Says Kyiv,” BBC News (BBC, January 14, 2022),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59992531.
30
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Russian Federation. U.S. sanctions have a mixed record at best when attempting to force a
change in behavior. This is largely due to the application of economic sanctions being the main,
and sometimes only, strategy used by the U.S. These sanctions must coincide with a diverse
group of other methods when dealing with a threat of such magnitude.
Conclusion
In conclusion, ensuring a safe and secure United States requires projecting strength and
taking decisive action to deter the cybersecurity threats that have come out of the Russian
Federation in recent years. It is imperative that the United States takes a stronger, more proactive
approach towards the fifth domain through persistent engagement and further collaboration with
the private sector. In addition, the United States should work with NATO counterparts to
identify, intercept, and expose the actors committing cyber-attacks, and promote all U.S. allies to
take conjoint actions against Russian cyber-attacks. Moreover, the United States should place
economic sanctions on the individuals responsible for the cyberattacks originating within the
Russian Federation depending on the level of devastation. These actions will project strength,
promote security, and bolster relationships between the U.S. and other free nations.
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